20 MPs Who Left Trinamool for the NCPI Seek Four More Weeks on Disqualification Notices

The news

New Delhi. Twenty Lok Sabha MPs who quit the Trinamool Congress and aligned themselves with the NCPI have asked for four more weeks to respond to notices issued by Speaker Om Birla. The notices were issued on petitions seeking their disqualification under the anti-defection law, The Hindu reports. The deadline the MPs had been given expired on Tuesday, September 22. NCPI parliamentary chairperson Kakoli Ghosh Dastidar said the MPs had not yet collected the documents needed for the response. The report does not say who filed the petitions, whether the extension was granted, or how the NCPI relates to the Trinamool’s factions. The anti-defection law is the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution, under which a legislator who voluntarily gives up membership of their party, or defies its whip in a vote, can lose their seat. The Speaker decides such petitions for the Lok Sabha. The notices come amid a split in the Trinamool. In an editorial titled ‘Freezing democracy’, The Hindu notes that on September 17, 2026, the Election Commission of India froze the All India Trinamool Congress’s name and its ‘grass and flowers’ symbol, almost 28 years after Mamata Banerjee founded the party. The Commission’s 14-page order said that because two rival groups, one led by Ms. Banerjee and the other by Arup Roy, both claim to be the party, the matter requires “substantive determination”. Until then neither group can use the name or symbol, and both have been given new names and symbols. A separate report in the paper on the Rajya Sabha bypoll refers to Ms. Banerjee’s party as the “Mamata All India Trinamool Congress”. The editorial notes that 41% of voters, more than 2.60 crore, voted for Ms. Banerjee’s party in the April 2026 West Bengal Assembly election, with a margin of about 32 lakh votes separating it from the BJP. It records that opposition parties have called similar freezes, as in the case of the Shiv Sena, “party theft”. The editorial goes on to argue that the Commission is “acting in tandem with the interests of the BJP”. That is the newspaper’s opinion; the Commission’s stated reason is the need to determine the dispute on its merits. The syllabus link is GS2: Parliament, the anti-defection law and the Election Commission.

Static syllabus linkage

1. The Tenth Schedule punishes leaving a party and defying its whip. The 52nd Amendment Act, 1985 added the Tenth Schedule. Under Paragraph 2(1)(a), a member elected on a party ticket is disqualified if they voluntarily give up membership of that party. Under Paragraph 2(1)(b), they are disqualified if they vote or abstain contrary to the party’s direction without permission, unless the party condones it within 15 days. An independent member who joins a party after election is disqualified, and so is a nominated member who joins a party more than six months after taking their seat. In Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court held that giving up membership voluntarily need not be formal and can be inferred from a member’s conduct.
2. After 2003, only a two-thirds merger protects a group. Paragraph 3 originally protected a ‘split’ supported by one-third of a legislature party. The 91st Amendment Act, 2003 deleted it. Paragraph 4 now protects members only when their original political party merges with another party, and such a merger is deemed to have taken place only if at least two-thirds of the members of the legislature party agree. The same amendment capped the size of the Council of Ministers at 15% of the strength of the House, and barred disqualified defectors from holding ministerial office until re-elected. In Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023), a Constitution Bench held that the political party, not the legislature party alone, appoints the whip, and that a split is no longer a defence.
3. The Speaker decides, subject to limited judicial review. Paragraph 6 makes the Speaker or Chairman the authority to decide questions of disqualification, and Paragraph 8 lets them make rules. For the Lok Sabha these are the Members of Lok Sabha (Disqualification on Ground of Defection) Rules, 1985. In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992), the Supreme Court upheld the Schedule. It held that the Speaker acts as a tribunal whose decisions are open to judicial review on limited grounds, and struck down Paragraph 7, which had barred the courts. The minority opinion held that making the Speaker the sole arbiter was itself unconstitutional because of the Speaker’s political position. In Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020), the Court said petitions should ordinarily be decided within three months, and suggested that Parliament consider an independent tribunal.
4. Disputes over a party’s name and symbol go to the Election Commission, not the Speaker. Paragraph 15 of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 empowers the Election Commission to decide which of the rival groups of a recognised party is that party. In Sadiq Ali v. Election Commission of India (1971), the Supreme Court upheld this power and the Commission’s use of majority tests. Freezing the name and symbol until the dispute is decided is an established interim step; the Commission used it for the Shiv Sena in 2022. In Subhash Desai (2023), the Court held that disqualification proceedings pending before the Speaker do not bar the Commission from deciding a Paragraph 15 dispute. It also cautioned that a majority in the legislature may not always be the right test. The two forums therefore run in parallel.

Why UPSC loves this

1. Anti-defection law is a perennial GS2 question. Mains has repeatedly asked whether the Tenth Schedule has achieved its purpose, whether the presiding officer should decide disqualification, and how delay undermines the law. This case adds a group of 20 MPs, a frozen party name and a request for more time, which touches all three issues.
2. Prelims tests the amendments and the case law. Questions have asked which amendment added the Tenth Schedule, who decides disqualification, what the 91st Amendment changed, and whether the presiding officer’s decision can be reviewed by courts. Kihoto Hollohan and the two-thirds merger rule are standard material.
3. The overlap between the Speaker and the Election Commission is a new angle. The Shiv Sena and NCP disputes showed that defection cases now run before two forums at once. An answer that explains how the Speaker’s finding and the Commission’s Paragraph 15 decision can diverge, and why that matters, will stand out from the standard answers.

Analysis

1. In defection cases, time matters more than documents. A member facing disqualification keeps voting, drawing allowances and building a new party while the petition is pending, so every extension works in their favour. The anti-defection law’s record shows that delay is the most common way it is defeated. That is why the Supreme Court in Keisham suggested three months as the ordinary limit. The counter-view is legitimate: natural justice requires a fair opportunity, twenty separate members may need individual replies, and the facts about party identity are complicated when the party’s own name is frozen. The test for the Speaker is whether the extension is needed to decide the case fairly or only postpones it.
2. The freeze makes the question ‘which party did they leave?’ harder. The Tenth Schedule measures defection against the party that set the member up as a candidate. With the Trinamool’s name frozen and two groups claiming it, the MPs’ defence may depend on how the Commission settles the Paragraph 15 dispute. The papers do not say how the NCPI relates to either faction, so this reasoning is conditional. Subhash Desai holds that the two forums run in parallel, but in practice each may wait for the other, which suits anyone who benefits from delay. The counter-view is that, according to The Hindu, the MPs ‘quit’ the Trinamool and aligned with another outfit, and under Ravi S. Naik conduct of that kind can itself show that they voluntarily gave up membership.
3. Since 2003, a group departure is either a merger or a disqualification. Before 2003, one-third of a legislature party could claim a split. Now, 20 MPs can escape disqualification only by showing that their original party merged with another and that two-thirds of the legislature party agreed. The papers do not give the numbers needed to judge that here. The 2003 reform was meant to end group defections, but experience has shown that mergers can be arranged instead. The counter-view has force too: the Tenth Schedule leaves members no lawful way to exit a party whose leadership they reject, so some reformers, following the Dinesh Goswami Committee on electoral reforms (1990), would limit disqualification for defying the whip to votes of confidence and no-confidence.
4. The flaw is that the judge belongs to a political party, and the alternatives have the same flaw. The Speaker is elected on a party ticket and decides cases that change the strength of parties in the House. The minority opinion in Kihoto Hollohan saw this as a fatal defect. Keisham suggested an independent tribunal, and the Dinesh Goswami Committee proposed that the President or Governor decide on the Election Commission’s advice. But this section’s other story shows the difficulty. The Commission is itself accused of partisanship in the same Bengal dispute, and two of its own members have recorded that decisions were taken without them. Moving the decision to another body does not create neutrality. A time limit written into the law and full judicial review may achieve more than a change of judge.
5. The editorial’s charge needs the Commission’s answer, but the pattern it describes is real. The Hindu’s editorial says the Commission is acting in the BJP’s interest; that is a strong opinion, not a finding. The Commission’s order gives a standard reason under Paragraph 15: rival claims need substantive determination, and freezing the symbol in the meantime keeps either group from gaining an advantage. It used the same step for the Shiv Sena in 2022. The pattern the editorial points to, however, is real. In recent years the Commission has recognised the group with the legislative majority as the party, as in the Shiv Sena and NCP cases, which gives defectors in the legislature a route to take over a party. Subhash Desai cautioned against relying only on legislative majority. How the Commission applies that caution here will show whether the editorial’s fear is justified.

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