UPSC Darpan

International RelationsGS226 September 2026

At 81 the UN Is ‘Overweight and Weak’; India Targets the 2028-29 Elected Council Seat

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The news

New Delhi. Three commentaries today assess the UN’s decline as the 81st UN General Assembly (UNGA) session winds down. The Hindu, in an editorial titled ‘Overweight and weak’, says this session carries “a unique sense of urgency” because it is Secretary-General António Guterres’s final session; it cites one study recording more than 65 conflicts across 35 countries in 2025, the highest since 1946. Polarisation, superpower wars in violation of the Charter and “unilateral and illegitimate sanctions” have left the UN “overweight, weak and unrepresentative”, it argues. Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman is President of the 81st session and will oversee the selection of the next Secretary-General. It notes that U.S. President Donald Trump again claimed to have negotiated peace in the 2025 India-Pakistan four-day war, the Russian President skipped the session and the U.S. denied visas to the Palestinian delegation. The EU-led Partnership for Multilateralism (P4M), co-sponsored by India, was “well-meaning” but “drowned out”. The Hindu calls it “surprising” that Prime Minister Narendra Modi skipped the UNGA speech and side summits while his government campaigns for an elected Security Council term in 2028-29. In The Indian Express, Syed Akbaruddin, former Permanent Representative of India to the UN, argues that “a declining United Nations is not good news for a rising India”. The veto lets each permanent member block action; Ukraine, Gaza and the Iran-Gulf war expose the Council. He warns that “weaponised interdependence” exposes Indian firms to rules their government did not write. Since Charter amendments require ratification by all five permanent members, “an elected seat is the nearer prospect”; India’s opponent for 2028-29 in the June 2027 election is Tajikistan, which has never served on the Council. India, a founding member in 1945, has contributed more than 275,000 personnel to UN peacekeeping. India helped launch P4M on September 21 with Brazil, Canada, Kenya, the EU, Australia and Barbados. Ram Madhav, BJP national vice-president, writes in the same paper that Mr. Guterres, in Delhi for the BRICS summit, said the Council is “paralysed” and that the UN needs not reform but “an overhaul”; he proposes that Global South leaders draft an “Indo-Pacific Charter” recognising multipolarity, as the 1941 Atlantic Charter preceded the UN. This continues cards of 22-25 September on P4M, the Tajikistan contest and veto restraint; what is new is the assessment. The syllabus link is GS2: important international institutions, their structure and mandate.

The chain in one line: UN Charter of 1945 freezes the victors of the Second World War as permanent members with a veto → Council expanded once, in 1965, but permanent membership never changed → reform talks stuck in the IGN process since 2009 as G4, UfC and the African Group disagree → wars in Ukraine, Gaza and the Gulf paralyse the Council, and leaders skip UNGA-81 → India shifts its near-term goal to an elected 2028-29 seat while co-founding P4M

Static syllabus linkage

  1. The Charter fixes the Council’s structure and makes reform hostage to the permanent five. Article 23 of the UN Charter sets the Security Council’s membership at 15: five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and ten non-permanent members elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, not eligible for immediate re-election. Article 27(3) requires decisions on substantive matters to have the concurring votes of all permanent members, which is the basis of the veto. Under Article 108, an amendment requires a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of member states, including all five permanent members; Article 109 provides for a general review conference on the same terms. The only expansion so far, from 11 to 15 members, came into force in 1965.
  2. Reform is negotiated in the IGN, where four blocs have competing models. Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Security Council reform began in the General Assembly in 2009. The G4 — India, Brazil, Germany and Japan — seek permanent seats for themselves and support each other’s bids. The Uniting for Consensus group, led by Italy and including Pakistan, opposes new permanent members and prefers longer-term elected seats. The African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus of 2005 demands two permanent seats with all prerogatives including the veto and five non-permanent seats for Africa, while the L.69 group of developing countries, of which India is part, supports expansion in both categories.
  3. Elected seats are won by a two-thirds secret ballot in the General Assembly. Non-permanent members are elected each June by secret ballot in the General Assembly, and a candidate needs two-thirds of members present and voting. Seats are allocated by regional groups; India contests from the Asia-Pacific group. India has served eight terms as a non-permanent member: 1950-51, 1967-68, 1972-73, 1977-78, 1984-85, 1991-92, 2011-12 and 2021-22. In 1996 India lost the Asia-Pacific seat to Japan, a reminder that such contests are not certain.
  4. The Secretary-General is chosen by the Council and the Assembly together. Under Article 97 the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council, so the recommendation is subject to the veto. By convention terms are five years and renewable once, and there has been an informal practice of regional rotation. António Guterres took office on January 1, 2017, and his second term ends on December 31, 2026. Since 2016 the General Assembly has made the selection more transparent with public candidate dialogues.

Why UPSC loves this

  1. UNSC reform is among the most repeated GS2 questions. UPSC has asked about the obstacles to India’s permanent membership and the need for reform of the Security Council. Today’s pieces add a sharper argument: that the ratification rule under Article 108 makes permanent membership distant, which is why India is concentrating on the elected seat.
  2. Prelims tests the UN’s structure. Questions have asked about the composition of the Security Council, the veto and the organs of the UN. Articles 23, 27, 97 and 108, and the difference between the G4 and Uniting for Consensus, are high-probability material.
  3. Multilateralism and the Global South are PSIR and GS2 themes. Answers on India’s role in a multipolar world can contrast reformist positions (Mr. Akbaruddin) with revisionist ones (Mr. Madhav’s call for an ‘Indo-Pacific Charter’), and use P4M as evidence of India working through issue-based coalitions.

Prelims nuggets

  • Under Article 23 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has 15 members, of which ten non-permanent members are elected for two-year terms and are not eligible for immediate re-election.
  • Article 27(3) of the UN Charter requires the concurring votes of the permanent members for decisions on non-procedural matters, which is the legal basis of the veto.
  • An amendment to the UN Charter under Article 108 requires adoption by two-thirds of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of UN members, including all permanent members of the Security Council.
  • Under Article 97 of the UN Charter, the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council.
  • The G4 comprises India, Brazil, Germany and Japan, which support one another’s bids for permanent membership of the Security Council.
  • The Ezulwini Consensus of the African Union seeks two permanent seats with veto and five non-permanent seats for Africa in the Security Council.
  • Non-permanent members of the Security Council are elected by the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting.

Analysis

  1. India has quietly accepted that permanent membership is a long game. Mr. Akbaruddin, who led India’s UN mission, now writes that an elected seat is “the nearer prospect” because Charter amendments need all five permanent members to ratify. That is a realistic reframing from someone who spent years on the reform campaign. It means India’s near-term strategy is to win elections in the Assembly and prove itself in the Council, rather than wait for a structural change that China, at least, can block. The risk is that reformist rhetoric continues at the top while the practical agenda shrinks, and small states notice the gap.
  2. Skipping UNGA sends a signal India may not intend. The Hindu finds it surprising that Mr. Modi skipped the UNGA speech in a year India is seeking votes, and Mr. Madhav notes this was the second successive absence. Elected-seat contests are won by courting many small states, each with one vote, and personal leadership presence matters in that courtship. The counter-view is that India’s External Affairs Minister is a heavyweight and that India hosted the BRICS summit weeks earlier. Still, a contest against Tajikistan, which has never served, should be comfortable, and India should not let it become close.
  3. Weaponised interdependence is the most practical threat the pieces identify. Mr. Akbaruddin’s example — an Indian company legal under Indian law but refused payment by a foreign bank or cover by an insurer — describes how sanctions now reach India through private networks rather than state decisions. The UN does not authorise these measures, and the Council cannot stop them. That is a sharper argument for UN relevance than abstract appeals to multilateralism: without a rules forum, India will be governed by rules written in Washington, Brussels or Beijing. The limit is that the UN has no power over payment systems either, so India must also build alternatives.
  4. Ram Madhav’s ‘Indo-Pacific Charter’ is a provocation rather than a plan. The Atlantic Charter worked as a founding text because the two powers that signed it were about to win a world war and could impose a new order. The Global South today has no comparable unity or power, and ‘Indo-Pacific’ is itself a term China rejects. The proposal is useful as a signal that India’s governing party sees the 1945 order as exhausted. But India also benefits from the Charter’s protection of sovereignty and non-intervention, and a new charter would reopen those principles too.
  5. P4M’s failure to be heard shows that coalitions of middle powers need an agenda, not only a name. The Hindu says P4M was drowned out; Mr. Akbaruddin says its members span diplomatic camps and can help India persuade countries it otherwise could not. Both can be true. A coalition of the EU, Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Australia, Barbados and India can matter only if it produces concrete proposals — on climate finance or protection against economic coercion, as Mr. Akbaruddin suggests. Its test will be whether it tables text in the next session, not whether it met this week.

Possible Mains question

“The Security Council was designed to work when the major powers could agree.” In the light of this statement, discuss why reform of the United Nations Security Council has stalled, and evaluate India’s strategy of pursuing an elected seat alongside its claim to permanent membership. (15 marks, 250 words)

Model approach

  1. Introduction. Begin with UNGA-81: Mr. Guterres’s last session, more than 65 conflicts in 35 countries in 2025 by one count, and The Hindu’s description of the UN as “overweight and weak”.
  2. Body — why reform has stalled. Explain Articles 23, 27 and 108; the need for all five permanent members to ratify; the IGN process since 2009; and the competing models of the G4, Uniting for Consensus, the Ezulwini Consensus and L.69. Add regional rivalries, including Pakistan and China on India’s bid.
  3. Body — India’s dual strategy. Discuss the 2028-29 candidature against Tajikistan in the June 2027 election, India’s eight earlier terms, its peacekeeping contribution of more than 275,000 personnel, and P4M as coalition-building. Contrast Mr. Akbaruddin’s reformism with Mr. Madhav’s call for a new charter.
  4. Body — risks. Note the Prime Minister’s absence from UNGA, weaponised interdependence that the UN cannot restrain, and the danger that the permanent-seat campaign becomes rhetorical.
  5. Conclusion. Conclude that India should use elected terms to demonstrate responsible leadership on peacekeeping mandates, AI rules and economic coercion, building the case for permanent membership through performance.

Administrator's brainstorm

You are a Joint Secretary in the UN division of the Ministry of External Affairs managing the 2028-29 campaign. What is your plan?

I would map every vote, especially in Africa, Latin America and the small island states, and match each with a concrete offer — capacity-building, peacekeeping training, development projects or support on their priorities. I would use initiatives such as the Group of Friends on seafarers and P4M to show India delivers on practical issues. I would schedule leader-level contacts, since small states value personal attention. And I would avoid complacency against an opponent that has never served.

As a peacekeeping contingent commander, how would you strengthen India’s claim at the UN?

India’s standing rests on disciplined, effective peacekeepers, so I would ensure strict conduct standards, zero tolerance for abuse and good relations with local communities. I would report honestly when a mandate cannot be carried out with the resources given, as Mr. Akbaruddin argues mandates must be achievable. I would deploy women officers in community engagement roles. Such performance is remembered by host countries when they vote.

An interview board asks: is the UN still relevant for India?

The Security Council is often paralysed, but the UN’s universal membership, its agencies and its scientific assessments remain valuable to a developing country. Without the UN, rules on trade, technology and climate would be written by a few powers alone, as Mr. Akbaruddin warns. India therefore gains more by reforming and using the UN than by abandoning it. Relevance is not given; it has to be earned by making the institution deliver.