Temporary Operational Bases Let Forces Hold the Pir Panjal and Choke Militant Crossings

The news

SRINAGAR / JAMMU — On September 4, a Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorist was killed in Ashdar Gali, in the upper reaches of the Pir Panjal mountains connecting Kashmir with Jammu’s Poonch, after a four-month effort by joint forces of the Army, its elite para forces, J&K Police and paramilitary forces, The Indian Express reported (Bashaarat Masood and Arun Sharma). The operation marked a shift in approach after “a series of setbacks over the last three years”: the forces operated out of a Temporary Operational Base (TOB) — a forward camp that lets troops stay in the mountains rather than raid and withdraw. “This is a temporary arrangement to maintain a more permanent footprint in the difficult mountain terrain,” a senior police officer said, explaining that forces now stay deployed for periods ranging from more than 10 days to several months, using a Gujjar dhok (shack) or a cave as shelter where available and otherwise operating from dense forest. The mountains are divided into three zones: Army paratroopers hold the upper reaches, using drones to watch large swathes of terrain; the middle range is manned by the Rashtriya Rifles, the Army’s anti-insurgency force, or by joint teams of J&K Police and paramilitary forces; the lower reaches are usually with the police and paramilitary. After the Pahalgam attack in April last year, which killed 25 tourists and one local, J&K Police raised new elite units within its Special Operations Group — ‘Snow Leopards’, trained for high-altitude winter warfare, and ‘Markhor’, trained for gunfights in dense forests. Officers said militants had held advantages at height, including stationary vantage points and American M4 carbines; special troops now carry comparable weapons and night-vision devices. The Pir Panjal divides Jammu from Kashmir: to its south lie Poonch and Rajouri, which connect to the Line of Control; it also links Kashmir to the Chenab Valley districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban, and stretches to Gulmarg and Baramulla. The Poonch-Rajouri axis was cleared under Operation Sarp Vinash, launched in 2003, and declared militant-free in 2012. Earlier, pressure on one side of the range pushed militants to the other; the TOBs, placed on “intelligence inputs and ground situation analysis”, remove that advantage. Most last a few weeks; the one at Ashdar Gali, above the Doodhpathri meadow, has been held for months. Officials still flag changing overground worker networks and new hideouts.

Static syllabus linkage

1. The Pir Panjal is the wall between Jammu and the Valley. The Pir Panjal range is part of the Lesser (Middle) Himalaya, running north-west to south-east and separating the Kashmir Valley from the Jammu region. Passes and routes across it include the Banihal pass, which the Jawahar tunnel and the newer Banihal-Qazigund tunnel bypass, and the Pir ki Gali on the historic Mughal Road linking Shopian with Poonch-Rajouri. South of the range, Poonch and Rajouri border the Line of Control, which makes the forests a transit zone for infiltrators.
2. The Rashtriya Rifles is a counter-insurgency force drawn from the Army. The Rashtriya Rifles was raised in 1990 as a dedicated counter-insurgency force for Jammu and Kashmir. Its personnel come on deputation from across the Army’s regiments and arms, and it operates under the Ministry of Defence. It allows the regular Army to focus on the Line of Control while the RR holds the hinterland.
3. Policing in J&K is now a Union subject in practice. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, J&K became a Union Territory with a legislature, but ‘public order’ and ‘police’ remain with the Lieutenant Governor, acting under the Union Home Ministry. The Special Operations Group is J&K Police’s counter-terror wing. Joint operations are coordinated through the Unified Headquarters, which brings together the Army, police, central armed police forces and intelligence agencies.
4. The legal basis for operations is AFSPA and UAPA. The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 gives the armed forces powers of search, arrest and use of force in ‘disturbed areas’. Lashkar-e-Toiba is a banned terrorist organisation listed in the First Schedule of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Overground workers — people who provide shelter, logistics and information to militants without carrying arms — can be prosecuted under UAPA.

Why UPSC loves this

1. GS3 asks about security challenges in border areas and their management. The syllabus lists ‘security challenges and their management in border areas’ and ‘linkages of organised crime with terrorism’. UPSC has asked about the role of the security forces in J&K and about infiltration across the LoC.
2. Geography questions follow security headlines. Prelims regularly tests Himalayan ranges and passes. The Pir Panjal, Banihal and the districts of Poonch, Rajouri, Doda and Kishtwar are likely map-based questions.

Analysis

1. Persistence beats speed in mountain counter-insurgency. The old approach — launch an operation, search, withdraw — let militants who knew the terrain outwait the forces. A TOB inverts that: the forces become the permanent presence and the militants the visitors. Staying for weeks or months costs more in logistics and fatigue, but denies militants rest and supply. The Ashdar Gali result after four months shows that patience is the doctrine, not a by-product.
2. The real target is movement, not numbers. The officers’ key point is that pressure south of the range pushed militants north and vice versa. By holding routes on both sides, the TOBs turn the range from a corridor into a trap. That makes success measurable in reduced crossings and fewer attacks in Poonch-Rajouri, rather than in kill counts alone. Metrics that reward kills can distort operations; metrics that reward denial of movement do not.
3. Layered deployment matches forces to terrain. Paratroopers at the top, Rashtriya Rifles or joint teams in the middle and police at the bottom is a sensible division of labour. The highest reaches need the best-trained and best-equipped troops, while the lower reaches need local knowledge and intelligence that only police have. The creation of Snow Leopards and Markhor shows the police moving up the terrain too. The risk is coordination failure between layers; the Unified Headquarters must ensure information flows faster than militants move.
4. The weak point remains the support network. Officials admit that overground worker networks keep changing and new hideouts appear. A military presence in the mountains cannot by itself cut the food, shelter and information that come from villages below. Relations with Gujjar and Bakarwal communities, whose dhoks the forces use, are therefore decisive. If those communities feel used or harassed, the forces lose the intelligence on which TOB placement depends.
5. The counter-view: long deployments carry human costs. Troops living for months in forests and caves face fatigue, weather and isolation, and the setbacks of recent years included losses of soldiers in ambushes. Sustained presence also raises the chance of friction with local people. The approach is sound, but it must be supported by rotation, medical evacuation, drones and communications so that it does not simply expose more soldiers for longer.

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