Amit Shah Unveils PRAHAAR’s Seven Pillars and an Extradition Portal at a National Counter-Terror Conference

The news

New Delhi. Union Home Minister Amit Shah on Monday, September 28, inaugurated a conference on ‘PRAHAAR – CT Policy and Strategy’ in New Delhi, calling for an institutionalised counter-terrorism framework with a whole-of-society approach, The Indian Express and The Economic Times report. PRAHAAR is an acronym for seven pillars: Prevention, Response, Aggregating Internal Capacities, Human Rights, Attenuating Conditions for Terrorism, Aligning International Efforts, and Recovery and Resilience. Per a PIB backgrounder, the Ministry of Home Affairs had unveiled PRAHAAR on February 23, 2026 as India’s first comprehensive national counter-terrorism policy and strategy; Monday’s conference was about putting it into practice. It was attended by the Union Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, heads of the Central Armed Police Forces and Central Police Organisations, Directors General of Police of 15 States and chiefs of Anti-Terrorism Squads (ATS) of all States and Union Territories. Mr. Shah said the government had adopted a zero-tolerance policy against all forms of terrorism. He called for strengthening PRAHAAR through continuous analysis of terror incidents and a concrete mechanism for the next 10 years, and said its principles must reach the thana (police station) level. The ET reports that he advocated an automated counter-terror response at every level. Between 2019 and 2026, Mr. Shah said, the government brought back 288 fugitive criminals to India from 36 countries. He launched a new “extradition portal” to speed up efforts to bring back fugitives from abroad, and urged State police forces to set up dedicated fugitive-tracking teams. Extradition is the formal surrender of an accused or convicted person by one country to another, usually under a treaty. Better coordination, he said, helped bust more than 40 modules of the Shahzad Bhatti network, allegedly involved in cross-border smuggling of weapons, explosives and narcotics; the ET adds that more than 100 FIRs were registered and 350 persons arrested across 15 States. On the same day, the IE reports, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation added Satinderjeet Singh, alias Goldy Brar, to its Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list and raised the reward from $50,000 to $1 million (about ₹9.58 crore). He is wanted for murder, extortion and drug distribution, is alleged to lead the Lawrence Bishnoi group in North America, and is accused of a role in the 2023 killing of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada. The IE also marks ten years since the surgical strikes of September 28-29, 2016, when Army Special Forces struck seven launchpads across the Line of Control after the Uri attack in which 19 soldiers were killed. Government data cited there show 322 militant incidents in 2016 against 12 terror-related incidents in 2025. The syllabus link is GS3 on terrorism, organised crime and security agencies.

Static syllabus linkage

1. The UAPA and the NIA Act are the two pillars of India’s counter-terror law. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) was originally a law against secessionist and unlawful associations; after the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 was repealed in 2004, terrorism provisions were added to it. The 2019 amendment allowed the Union government to designate individuals, not just organisations, as terrorists, and allowed NIA officers of the rank of Inspector and above to investigate UAPA cases. The National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 was passed after the November 2008 Mumbai attacks and created a central agency to investigate scheduled offences across States without their prior consent. Its 2019 amendment allowed the NIA to investigate scheduled offences committed outside India against Indian citizens or Indian interests, and added offences such as human trafficking and cyber-terrorism.
2. Extradition runs through the Extradition Act, 1962, treaties and diplomatic channels. The Extradition Act, 1962 governs both requests from India to foreign states and requests to India, and the Consular, Passport and Visa Division of the Ministry of External Affairs is the central authority. Extradition is usually based on a bilateral treaty; where none exists, it can proceed on the basis of an arrangement or an international convention to which both countries are party. Treaties generally require ‘dual criminality’, meaning the act must be an offence in both countries, and exclude offences of a political character, although most modern treaties exclude terrorism from the political-offence exception. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) in criminal matters are a separate channel for gathering evidence, serving summons and tracing assets, with the Ministry of Home Affairs as India’s central authority.
3. An Interpol Red Notice is a request to locate a person, not an arrest warrant. Interpol, headquartered in Lyon, France, issues colour-coded notices at the request of member countries. A Red Notice asks law enforcement worldwide to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending extradition or similar legal action, but each country decides under its own law whether to act on it. In India, the Central Bureau of Investigation is the National Central Bureau for Interpol and routes such requests. Interpol’s constitution bars it from intervening in matters of a predominantly political, military, religious or racial character, which is sometimes invoked to resist notices.
4. Intelligence fusion and financial action complete the architecture. The Multi Agency Centre (MAC) under the Intelligence Bureau is the platform for real-time sharing of terror-related intelligence between central agencies and States, with Subsidiary MACs in State capitals; PIB describes PRAHAAR as formalising such real-time sharing. The National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), conceived after the 2008 Mumbai attacks, links databases such as travel, banking and telecom records for authorised agencies. Internationally, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), set up by the G7 in 1989, sets standards against money laundering and terror financing, and India became a full member in 2010. The UN General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006, and India has pressed since 1996 for a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

Why UPSC loves this

1. GS3 lists terrorism, organised crime and security agencies by name. The GS3 syllabus covers linkages of organised crime with terrorism, security challenges in border areas, and various security forces and agencies and their mandate. UPSC has asked about the need for a coordinated national counter-terror architecture and about the linkages between drug trafficking and terrorism. The Shahzad Bhatti network, dealing in weapons, explosives and narcotics, is a textbook example.
2. Federalism in policing is a recurring angle. Police and public order are State subjects, while terrorism crosses State borders. Questions on the NIA, NATGRID and the proposed National Counter Terrorism Centre have tested this tension. PRAHAAR’s stress on percolating to the thana level and on State fugitive-tracking teams is an attempt to solve it through coordination rather than central control.
3. Prelims favours agencies, laws and international bodies. The UAPA amendments, the NIA’s jurisdiction, Interpol notices and FATF membership are regular Prelims material. The difference between an extradition treaty and an MLAT is a likely statement-type question.

Analysis

1. A written doctrine matters because India’s counter-terror response has been episodic. For decades India responded to terror through agencies created after each major attack: the NIA and NATGRID after 2008, for instance. A written national policy with named pillars sets a common vocabulary for central agencies and State police, and a 10-year horizon forces planning beyond the next incident. The inclusion of Human Rights and Attenuating Conditions for Terrorism as pillars is significant: it concedes that counter-terrorism is not only force but also legitimacy and prevention of radicalisation. The test will be whether these softer pillars get budgets and indicators, or remain words on a slide.
2. The thana level is where counter-terrorism is won or lost. Most terror modules are detected through local clues: a tenant who cannot be verified, a suspicious purchase of chemicals, a pattern of small crimes. Mr. Shah’s insistence that PRAHAAR reach the police station level recognises that ATS units and central agencies depend on the beat constable. But thana-level police are overstretched with law-and-order duties and have little training in counter-terror indicators. Without investment in local police capacity, which Prakash Singh-type reforms were meant to support, the policy risks remaining a headquarters document.
3. Crime-terror convergence is the real threat, and PRAHAAR must treat gangs and drugs as security issues. The Shahzad Bhatti network combined weapons, explosives and narcotics smuggling, and the FBI describes the Bishnoi group as engaged in murders, extortion and drug trafficking across North America. Gangs provide logistics, money and deniable foot soldiers that terror groups can use. This blurs the old line between organised crime, a police matter, and terrorism, a national security matter. The more than 100 FIRs and 350 arrests across 15 States show that only coordinated, multi-State action can dismantle such networks.
4. Extradition success depends as much on India’s credibility abroad as on a portal. Bringing back 288 fugitives from 36 countries in seven years is a substantial record, and a portal can speed the paperwork and let States track cases. But foreign courts decide extradition on evidence, dual criminality and assurances about fair trial and prison conditions. Well-prepared case files and consistent respect for due process at home strengthen India’s requests abroad. The Goldy Brar case shows another route: when a fugitive is also wanted by the host country, cooperation becomes easier, though it also means India may have to wait for that country’s own prosecution.
5. Counter-view: the surgical-strikes decade shows success brings new risks. Militant incidents in Jammu and Kashmir fell from 322 in 2016 to 12 terror-related incidents in 2025, per government data cited by the IE, and surveillance is far better. But the threat has moved to Jammu’s forests, and former Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (retd) warns that the risk of escalation has gone up, as seen during Operation Sindoor. A counter-terror strategy that relies on cross-border retaliation must also manage escalation between nuclear-armed neighbours. PRAHAAR’s pillar on aligning international efforts is the diplomatic side of this equation.

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