Chhattisgarh High Court seeks State’s reply on staying the 2026 Freedom of Religion Act

The news

Raipur, October 8. A Chhattisgarh High Court Bench of Chief Justice Krushna Ram Mohapatra and Justice Santosh Sharma has given the State three weeks to reply on interim relief in a petition challenging the Chhattisgarh Freedom of Religion Act, 2026 and its Rules, The Indian Express reports. Nothing has been stayed yet. Senior advocate S. Muralidhar argued that faith should not depend on State approval or prior notice, yet even voluntary converts must make public disclosures and obtain several clearances. Per the petitioners, priests and pastors facilitating conversions must register, and offences carry at least seven years’ imprisonment, extendable to life, and fines up to ₹10 lakh. They seek a stay on the public notice and objections clauses. An earlier challenge was dismissed as premature on April 24, per that order, because the Act was not yet notified.

Static syllabus linkage

1. Article 25 protects the right to propagate, and Stainislaus held this is not a right to convert. Article 25(1) gives all persons freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practise and propagate religion, subject to public order, morality and health. In Rev. Stainislaus v State of Madhya Pradesh (1977), a Constitution Bench read “propagate” as spreading one’s faith, not converting another, upholding the Madhya Pradesh and Orissa laws on public-order grounds.
2. Later judgments place the choice of faith inside privacy and liberty. K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017), a nine-judge Bench, held privacy a fundamental right under Article 21, including autonomy over intimate choices. In Shafin Jahan v Asokan K.M. (2018), the Hadiya case, the Court held that an adult’s choice of faith and partner is her own.

Why UPSC loves this

1. Anti-conversion laws test Article 25 against Article 21. GS2 covers “significant provisions and basic structure” of the Constitution, and GS1 asks about “communalism, regionalism and secularism”; this case sits at both.

Analysis

1. The real dispute is over the voluntary convert, not the coerced one. No petitioner defends conversion by force or fraud. The challenge is to what the law asks of an adult who converts willingly: public notice, a wait for objections and official clearance. The State will say notice is the only way to catch inducement in time.
2. Lens — Liberty and order: punishing proven coercion is proportionate, screening every convert is not. Stainislaus rested on public order; a private change of faith rarely threatens it. Punishing proven force or fraud is a narrow, necessary measure. Making every convert announce the decision reaches people who harmed no one and invites the pressure the law claims to prevent. A thoughtful officer would keep the penal clauses and expect the notice regime to fail proportionality.
3. The interim order may matter more than the final verdict. Courts rarely stay a statute, and final judgments take years. If the notice clauses operate meanwhile, conversions will be deterred in practice. Seeking a stay only on procedure makes relief easier to grant.

Administrator's brainstorm