UPSC Darpan

Environment & EcologyGS315 October 2026

Kigali at 10: India must freeze HFCs in 2028 and cut them 85% by 2047 as cooling demand doubles

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The news

New Delhi. The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol turns ten on October 15; an Indian Express column by Durwood Zaelke and Zerin Osho sets out India’s task. In force since January 2019, it binds parties to phase down hydrofluorocarbons, the refrigerants that replaced CFCs but warm the planet hundreds to thousands of times more than CO2. India ratified in 2021 and must freeze HFC production and consumption in 2028, cut 10% below that baseline in 2032 and 85% by 2047. The Ozone Secretariat puts the gain at about 0.1°C avoided by mid-century and up to 0.5°C by 2100. Cooling already takes slightly more than a tenth of India’s electricity (IEA), and demand will more than double by 2035. Per an MoEFCC memorandum of April 1, 2026, no new HFC production capacity will be cleared beyond December 31, 2027.

The chain in one line: Hotter summers → more ACs and cold chains → more HFC leakage and coal power → more warming → Kigali caps HFCs from 2028 → industry redesigns for low-GWP gases → price and finance decide who gets cooling

Static syllabus linkage

  1. Vienna, Montreal and Kigali are one legal family. The Vienna Convention (1985) is the framework; the Montreal Protocol (1987) is its operating treaty; Kigali (2016, 28th Meeting of the Parties) adds HFCs. India ratified Kigali after Cabinet approval on August 18, 2021. Article 5 parties are developing countries with later schedules; the Multilateral Fund (since 1991) pays their agreed incremental costs.
  2. India regulates these gases through the ODS Rules and the EIA Notification. The Ozone Depleting Substances (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000, under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, license production, import and use of controlled substances. HFC manufacture is Item 5(f) of the EIA Notification, 2006.

Why UPSC loves this

  1. Can India meet its Kigali schedule without pricing cooling out of reach?. GS3 lists “conservation, environmental pollution and degradation”; GS2 lists “important international institutions, agencies and fora”. Expect the schedule and groups, the refrigerant-plus-efficiency transition, and Multilateral Fund finance.

Prelims nuggets

  • India is an Article 5 Group 2 party: HFC freeze in 2028, cuts of 10% (2032), 20% (2037), 30% (2042) and 85% (2047) below a baseline of average 2024–26 HFC use plus 65% of 2009–10 HCFC-22 use.
  • The India Cooling Action Plan (March 2019) targets cuts of 20–25% in cooling demand, 25–30% in refrigerant demand and 25–40% in cooling energy use by 2037–38.
  • Under Kigali, HFCs are controlled by warming impact (CO2-equivalent), not ozone-depleting potential.

Analysis

  1. The cooling paradox means India’s cap is set in the years its demand grows fastest. Each hotter summer sells more machines, and each machine leaks gas and burns coal power. The IEA puts cooling at a tenth of India’s electricity, doubling by 2035; and India’s baseline is the average of 2024–26, the years of this surge. A high baseline makes the 2028 freeze painless and the 2047 cut harder, since the 85% is measured from it. The other view: hot countries were given time for this reason, and equipment bought before 2032 may run “well into the 2030s”. That holds for the freeze, not later cuts.
  2. Lens — Sustain: the transition is affordable only if efficiency pays for the refrigerant switch. A low-GWP gas such as propane (R-290) needs a redesigned, flame-safe machine, which someone pays for. UNEP and the IEA estimate that doing the refrigerant change and the efficiency upgrade together roughly doubles the climate benefit; the electricity saved over an appliance’s life pays for it. Yet efficiency is not a binding Kigali obligation (Ozone Secretariat), and the Multilateral Fund has opened only modest windows for it. The other view: performance standards already cover about 89% of global AC energy use (IEA), so the market may move ahead of the treaty.
  3. India’s bargain was a late schedule for finance, and the memorandum shows it is now being enforced. India held out at Kigali for the slowest group and for the Multilateral Fund to pay agreed incremental costs. The MoEFCC memorandum of April 1, 2026 is the domestic end of that bargain: cleared plants must start production by December 31, 2027, and no new HFC capacity is cleared after that, so the baseline cannot be padded. The other view, from industry: India makes HFCs and could lose that market to importers if the cut-off bites before alternatives are commercial; the 2021 Cabinet note expected low-GWP manufacturing instead.

Possible Mains question

Discuss the challenge India faces in meeting its Kigali Amendment schedule while cooling demand is set to double. (10 marks, 150 words)

Model approach

  1. Directive — Discuss. Present obligation and difficulty, then reconcile them.
  2. Introduction — the treaty turns ten as India’s cooling need doubles. Sample: Ten years after Kigali, India must freeze HFCs in 2028 and cut them 85% by 2047, even as its cooling demand doubles by 2035.
  3. Body — the paradox: more heat, more cooling, more HFCs, and a baseline set in the boom years. Value addition: baseline = average 2024–26 HFC use plus 65% of 2009–10 HCFC-22 (MoEFCC).
  4. Body — the fix is refrigerant plus efficiency together. Draw a flowchart: ‘cooling warms’ splitting into ‘refrigerant leak’ and ‘electricity’, merging at ‘double benefit’.
  5. Body — the bargain: a late Group 2 schedule, Fund finance and a 2027 cut-off on new plants. Efficiency is not a Kigali obligation; India must legislate it.
  6. Conclusion — regulate the gas, reward the machine. Sample: As MoEFCC, I would notify the quota rules before 2028 and move BEE standards in step, so the cleaner machine is also cheaper to run.

Administrator's brainstorm

As Joint Secretary, Ozone Cell, you must choose how to allocate India’s 2028 HFC quotas. What method do you adopt?

My options: allocate by historical share of the 2024–26 baseline, which rewards the fastest expanders; auction the quotas, which could price out small cold-chain users; or allocate by GWP-weighted share with a reserve for low-GWP conversion. I would adopt the third: historical shares weighted so a tonne of high-GWP gas costs more quota, a set-aside for firms that have switched to R-290, and a published register, which stops stockpiling and gives small users predictable supply. The stakeholders are producers, appliance makers, hospitals and the consumer at 45°C. The deciding principle is predictability: the rule must be known before the baseline closes.