Naga–Kuki Clashes in Manipur Cross 50 Deaths Since February as Drug-Route Rivalry Sustains Violence

The news

New Delhi and Imphal. The death toll in clashes between Nagas and Kukis in Manipur has risen to over 50 since the Yumnam Khemchand Singh-led BJP government took office in February after a period of President’s Rule, with the latest killings in Kamjong and Senapati districts, The Indian Express reports. This marks a shift from the Meitei–Kuki conflict that began in May 2023. New since this magazine’s September 26 AFSPA card is the IE’s analysis of why this conflict is harder to contain. A Manipur Police officer explains that when Meitei–Kuki clashes began, the two communities separated within months, Kukis to the hills and Meiteis to the valley, allowing a buffer zone guarded by security forces. “In the hills, the populations are mixed. It is nearly impossible to guard every village.” Clashes have been reported across Ukhrul, Kamjong, Senapati and Kangpokpi, and the conflict plays out over roads and highways, disrupting supplies. Tensions first flared at Litan-Sareikhong in Ukhrul over a local altercation. On March 11, 21 Nagas were “abducted” near Mongkot Chephu and released after negotiations. Killings on May 13 in Kangpokpi were followed by retaliatory abductions by both sides and the killing of six Naga men abducted from the Leilon Vaiphei area. Armed groups based in Myanmar widened the conflict, and earlier attacks raised concerns about a Myanmar-based Kuki armed group, KNA-B. Security sources say an economic contest over the illicit drug trade may be sustaining the violence. Moreh in Tengnoupal, once the main transit point for narcotics, has largely come under Kuki control since 2023, and routes through Kamjong, a predominantly Naga area, have emerged as an alternative. “So there is now a competition between groups over access, routes and money,” an officer says. A July church-led initiative in Aizawl did not become a political dialogue, and the Kuki Zonal Council and the United Naga Council (UNC) blame each other. The two Deputy Chief Ministers, Nemcha Kipgen for the Kuki-Zo and Losii Dikho for the Nagas, meant to manage competing interests, have become opposing voices. With Assembly elections due early next year, the UNC demands abrogation of the Suspension of Operations pact with Kuki armed groups, action over the six killings and Ms. Kipgen’s removal. Its three-month economic blockade of highways through Senapati was suspended on September 26 after a meeting with the Union Home Ministry and the State government, and the Centre assured it the demands would be addressed. “We are largely responding to incidents,” a security officer says. One unexpected shift: Kuki leaders are reaching out to Meiteis, and 40 to 50 Kukis enter Imphal daily for healthcare and flights. The syllabus link is GS3 on border-area security and organised crime.

Static syllabus linkage

1. Article 371C gives Manipur’s hill areas a special constitutional voice. Article 371C, inserted by the Constitution (Twenty-seventh Amendment) Act, 1971 when Manipur became a State, allows the President to provide for a committee of the Manipur Legislative Assembly consisting of members elected from the Hill Areas. The Governor has a special responsibility to secure the proper functioning of that committee and must report annually, or whenever required, to the President on the administration of the Hill Areas. The executive power of the Union extends to giving directions to the State on the administration of those areas. The provision recognises that the hill districts, home mainly to Naga and Kuki-Zo tribes, differ from the valley in land, custom and administration.
2. Manipur’s hills are outside the Sixth Schedule, which shapes the politics of land and autonomy. The Sixth Schedule, under Articles 244(2) and 275(1), provides autonomous district councils with legislative powers in tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram only. Manipur’s hill areas instead have district councils created by an Act of Parliament, the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971, with far weaker powers. Demands for greater autonomy, whether a separate administration for Kuki-Zo areas or integration of Naga areas under the Naga peace process, compete over the same hill territory. Because Naga and Kuki villages are interspersed, every territorial demand by one group is seen as a threat by the other.
3. The Suspension of Operations pact is a ceasefire with conditions, not a peace settlement. The Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement was signed in 2008 between the Union government, the Manipur government and Kuki armed groups under two umbrella bodies, the Kuki National Organisation and the United People’s Front. Under its ground rules, cadres stay in designated camps, deposit weapons in locked storage and receive a monthly stipend, while security forces suspend operations against them. The pact is reviewed and extended periodically. Critics, including Naga bodies and Meitei groups, argue that some signatory groups have violated the ground rules, which is why its abrogation is now a UNC demand.
4. Manipur sits on the route of the Golden Triangle drug trade, governed at home by the NDPS Act. The Golden Triangle is the region where the borders of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet, historically one of the world’s largest sources of opium and methamphetamine. Manipur shares a land border with Myanmar, and India’s border with Myanmar is about 1,643 km long, running through Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is India’s main anti-drug law, and the Narcotics Control Bureau, set up in 1986, coordinates enforcement. Article 355 places a duty on the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance, which is the basis for central forces’ role in Manipur.

Why UPSC loves this

1. GS3 asks about security in border areas and the organised crime–insurgency link. The GS3 syllabus covers security challenges and their management in border areas, and linkages of organised crime with terrorism. UPSC has asked about the Northeast’s insurgency, the porous India–Myanmar border and drug trafficking. The drug-route rivalry in Kamjong is a direct illustration of how crime economics sustain ethnic violence.
2. GS2 on federalism and special provisions for the Northeast. Articles 371A to 371H, the Sixth Schedule and the role of the Governor are frequent Prelims and Mains themes. Manipur is a useful contrast: special provisions exist under Article 371C, but the hills are outside the Sixth Schedule, which shapes demands for autonomy.
3. Ethnic conflict questions reward institutional, not partisan, answers. Mains questions on the Manipur crisis expect candidates to explain causes and suggest institutional solutions without taking sides. The shift from a Meitei–Kuki to a Naga–Kuki axis shows why analysts stress land, identity and resources rather than any single community.

Analysis

1. The buffer-zone model that contained the valley–hill conflict cannot work in mixed hill villages. After May 2023, security forces could hold a line between the valley and the hills because the two communities had separated. The Naga–Kuki conflict has no such line: villages of both communities are interspersed along the same roads, as the Manipur Police officer notes. Security forces cannot guard every village, so the strategy of separation that brought uneasy quiet to the valley does not transfer. This means the conflict needs a political and community-level solution far more urgently, because a military one is not available.
2. The drug economy turns an identity dispute into a contest over money. When the Meitei–Kuki conflict cut Moreh off from Imphal, it broke an existing trafficking chain, and routes through Kamjong gained value. Armed groups that control a route gain income, and income sustains fighters and weapons. This helps explain why violence continues despite apologies and church-led talks. Any peace effort that ignores the drug economy will fail, which means border management with Myanmar, NDPS enforcement against financiers and alternative livelihoods are as important as dialogue.
3. Power-sharing without a common agenda has hardened the conflict. Two Deputy Chief Ministers representing the Kuki-Zo and the Nagas was meant to give each community a voice inside government. Instead, according to the IE, they have become opposing voices, and accusations between them have made the arrangement part of the conflict. Power-sharing works only when leaders share responsibility for a common outcome, such as security of highways or relief for the displaced. The lesson is that representation must be tied to joint decision-making, not simply the presence of both sides.
4. Blockades and election timing raise the stakes. The UNC’s three-month blockade through Senapati choked supplies to the rest of the State, and its suspension came only after the Home Ministry promised to address its demands. With Assembly elections due early next year, each community’s leaders have incentives to take visible hard positions. Demands such as abrogating the Suspension of Operations pact touch the interests of other groups and could provoke fresh violence if handled abruptly. The Centre must avoid promises to one side that it cannot keep without alienating the other.
5. Counter-view: the Kuki–Meitei thaw shows conflicts can shift, and that is an opening. The same report notes that Kuki leaders are reaching out to Meiteis and 40 to 50 Kukis enter Imphal daily without facing resistance. That is a small but real sign that relations can change when interests shift. It suggests that sustained contact, access to services and shared economic stakes can reduce hostility. Policy should build on such openings, for instance through safe access to hospitals, markets and airports for all communities, rather than treat Manipur’s divisions as permanent.

Administrator's brainstorm